9.3 Shame and intersubjectivity
Kemper (2006) is concerned with “the
power-status theory of emotions” and argues that we feel shame/embarrassment
when we sense that we are inadequate. He builds his theory on the works of
Goffman, especially The Presentation of Self in Everyday Life (Goffman 1959) and Behavior
in Public Places
(Goffman 1963). When we have done something we are ashamed of, the result is
often an experience of lost honour. The way out of this shame is not through
punishment, but through compensation:
An act or actions that reinstate the person as one who deserves the
amount of status originally claimed that has been lost. Thus, if someone acts
in a cowardly manner and has thus brought shame on himself or herself, the
solution usually is to engage in immoderately risky behavior to show that the
act of cowardice was an aberration and not characteristic (Kemper 2006: 100).
Because one is not conferring it in adequate amounts. This can lead
either to guilt or shame/embarrassment, or both. If the reason for the
deprivation of the other is a power tactic by the self, it will lead to
guilt…If the reason, on the other hand, for the deprivation is an inadequacy of
the self, then the emotion is shame/embarrassment (Kemper 2006: 101).
Guilt, in this theory, is “concerned
with doing wrong to another via excess power, frequently in violation of a
moral standard” (Kemper 2006:100). One feels guilt because of a wrong doing
which makes one feel that “one does not deserve to receive the amount of status
one has claimed for oneself” (Kemper 2006: 100). A person can feel both shame
and guilt in the same situation, but according to Kemper it is important to
keep them separate. They come from different forms of relationships and the
methods needed to cope with them will also differ.
Some investigations into shame and
guilt argue that they should be understood as social emotions that appear
between people (Scheff and Retzinger 1997; Tangery and Dearing 2002; Turner
2002, 2006; Turner and Stets 2005, 2006). In social constructionist terms one
can say that shame and guilt are social constructions that are defined by
culture through learned vocabularies of emotions (Turner 2007). The concepts of
shame and guilt seem to be found in many different forms of human activities,
not just in transgressions but also where we find clear differences between
people.
Baumeister, Stillwell and Heatherton
(1994) state that shame and guilt serve many unifying functions, including
motivating people to treat colleagues well in order to avoid transgressions,
minimize differences and make it possible for less powerful colleagues to make
their own decisions and to redistribute emotional despair. Both shame and guilt
are common forms of despair and have an effect on many of our actions. Some may
use them to excuse their offenders, to express sympathy, to manipulate others,
to decline having sex, in the upbringing of children, as a support to
self-control, and much more. We may avoid a surprisingly large number of behaviors
because of the expectation of shame or guilt.
Shame and guilt are emotions that
may be found between people as interpersonal reactions (Baumeister et al 1994).
This indicates that they are interpersonal phenomena which are both functional
and causally tied together with fellowship relations between humans. Their
origin, function and development all have important interpersonal aspects. They
can work in social relations so that social bonds are strengthened by producing
confirmation of care and obligation. They are also mechanisms for smoothing out
imbalances and differences in emotional despair within a relation and for
exercising influence on others. Their social nature goes much further than the
common understanding of moral standards. They appear throughout the lifespan,
primarily in interpersonal relations. Some experiences of shame and guilt will
naturally occur in the private sphere; in one’s mind and in social isolation.
But still, most of these will be drawn from interpersonal processes carried out
by well adapted individuals with internalised reference groups.
Attempts to construct clear and
unambiguous definitions of shame and guilt often fail because the terms are
used in many different ways, often disregarding the fact that they really are
two different emotions, connected to different kinds of experiences. Baumeister
et al. (1994) argue that psychologists are mainly interested in subjective
feelings of guilt. Approaching guilt as a subjective state of being entails
that other important and influential ways in which guilt is used become
irrelevant. Judicial guilt e.g., has technical definitions that are quite
independent of subjective feelings or even feelings of responsibility for past
actions. Judicial guilt is based on violations of judicial rules, even though
the technical meaning of judicial guilt has developed; it does not depend
merely on the quality and quantity of the evidence. Lewis (1971) writes that
people can be guilty without feeling any special emotion, as with the judicial
definition of guilt. This is discussed further by Ortony (1987) in his article Is Guilt an Emotion?. He is of the opinion that there are at least
two forms of guilt; one that is socio-judicial and the other that has an
emotional meaning.
Baumeister et al. (1994) understand
guilt as an individual’s unpleasant emotional state of being in connection with
possible objections to his or her actions, lack of action, circumstances, or
intentions. Guilt is an emotional despair, which is different than fear and
anger, and based on the possibility than one may have done something wrong and
that others may believe that you have transgressed as well. Guilt differs from
shame especially because guilt relates itself to a special action, and shame
relates itself to the whole self (Lewis 1971).
Guilt can be differentiated from a fear of punishment since the despair
relates to the action rather than to the expectation of the action. One can
naturally feel guilt in situations where there is little chance of punishment
and therefore little fear. Knowledge of having offended another person can be
enough to create guilt, even if the offended person is not able to retaliate
against the transgression. On the other hand, it may be difficult to fear
punishment from others without feeling some kind of guilt, except when the
other person reacts with hostility rather than feeling offended. When guilt is
understood as a subjective emotional condition, this means that intra psychic
processes are also present. Baumeister et al. (1994) argue that these intrapsychic
reactions are significant because of their intrapersonal character.
From an interpersonal perspective,
the most common cause of guilt would be causing injury, loss, or despair to a
person one has a relationship with. Even though guilt is often tied to close
relationships, it is not restricted to them. Proneness to guilt can be generalised
from other relationships, including group relationships. Well socialised
persons will probably also have learned to feel guilt about causing injury to
strangers. An interpersonal perspective, however, means that reactions to guilt
will be stronger and more common and meaningful in close relationships than in
weak or distant relationships.
Kaare T. Pettersen
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